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Abstract
This thesis is about the development of cooperation and measures of success among
self-interested agents in a dened ability-based two-player asymmetric game that is
structured as a round-robin tournament. Our research is motivated by the notion that
in many systems cooperative behaviour depends on some parameters that are usually
not considered in existing research. These include: the balance between individual
activity and interaction with others; the impact of agents' ability levels; and the need
to maintain balance between individual and group performance. In this thesis, we
examine all these issues by using a dened game-theoretic modelling and simulation
framework. Our simulation experiments on six agent group compositions establish
some patterns of how an agent's ability and strategy impact its individual and overall
group performance. The results demonstrate that the design framework supports
methodical comparative studies of strategy proles with respect to specic individual
and group performance measures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An important aspect of contemporary technological developments is the rise of arti-
cial intelligent systems that are built to autonomously perform increasingly complex
and responsible tasks delegated to them. They are often built as multiagent sys-
tems (MAS) [Wooldridge, 2009], that is, they consist of interacting intelligent and
autonomous units, called agents, which perform individual subtasks but also work
together towards common objectives of the system as a whole. Specialized individual
agents may be independently designed, and the system may be placed in an operating
environment whose characteristics are not entirely known in advance. In anticipa-
tion of such circumstances, robust design should enable individual agents to develop
cooperation in real time, choosing appropriate strategies depending on the task re-
quirements, perceived environment, and observed behaviour of other agents.
These considerations lead in part to a more general question of how and when co-
operation develops in a society of self-interested intelligent individuals. This problem,
with some variations, is of common interest to many elds, such as evolutionary biol-
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ogy and its generalizations to human society, psychology, political science, economics,
and philosophy. The primary mathematical tool employed is game theory, and much
of existing research is centred around variations of a single two-player game, known
as Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The paradox of PD is that both players receive higher
rewards (`payos') when they choose to cooperate with each other than when they
both refuse to cooperate (`mutual defection'), and yet the game-theoretic optimal-
ity criteria (dominant strategy, Nash Equilibrium) lead to mutual defection. This is
caused by the fact that the highest payo is provided to the player who defects against
a cooperator, and the lowest for unreciprocated cooperation [Axelrod, 2006]. As aptly
observed in [Grinberg et al., 2010], \because of this the PD game represents a conict
between individual and collective rationality." However, subsequent research revealed
that the pessimistic social implications of the initial PD analysis can be overcome by
many dierent techniques, including iterated play among multiple agents with dier-
ent strategies, controlled acquisition of knowledge about strategies of other players,
etc. [Kretz, 2011, Takahashi, 2010, Axelrod, 2006].
The present study is motivated by the observation that cooperation in many nat-
ural and articial systems depends on additional parameters that are largely absent
from existing PD-centred research literature. One such aspect is the balance between
individual activity and interaction with others. In many areas, such as academic study
or research, one can make progress by working individually and by working with oth-
ers, with the balance often guided by rational factors other than abstract `selshness'
or `altruism'.
Furthermore, the agents may dier in their levels and types of ability. The deci-
sions on whether, when, and with whom to cooperate may well be informed by one's
own ability and that of the prospective partner. However, the idea that payos may
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depend on characteristics of the players and not only on the game itself does not t
with the xed-payo matrix of PD and is largely absent from PD-based research.
A practical multiagent system design usually needs to maintain a balance between
the individual success of self-interested agents in addressing the individual objectives
associated with their subtasks, and the success of the group as a whole in completing
the overall task. This type of balance is insuciently explored as most studies either
exclusively focus on maximizing individual payos ([Takahashi, 2010, Kretz, 2011])
or emphasize group interest ([Grinberg et al., 2010]).
This thesis investigates all three of the above issues within a unied game-theoretic
modelling and simulation framework. The framework implements and uses the ABC
and EABC games dened in [Polajnar and Polajnar, 2018] specically for use in this
research. ABC is a two-player game in which players can cooperate or defect. It is
derived from a base PD game. In every encounter, the players' payos depend on the
individual abilities of the two participating players. EABC combines an agent's ABC
payos with gains from the agent's individual activity to form the total individual
score.
The framework simulator allows the experimenter to dene a group composed of
players with dierent abilities, that employ a number of dierent strategies. They play
a round-robin tournament that may be iterated if required. We adopt the iterated
round-robin tournament (IRRT) structure as opposed to the more commonly used
Axelrod tournament structure. The calculated tournament scores reect individual
success and group success.
One purpose of the framework is to investigate the properties of dierent strategies
by which agents decide to cooperate or defect. The `naive' strategies include naive
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cooperators, who always cooperate, and naive defectors, who always defect. The
`advanced' strategies have a certain knowledge about the partner. For instance, they
may involve knowledge of the partner's strategy type, or of the partner's ability level.
In this work, we are not concerned with how such knowledge is acquired (there are
dierent techniques explored in the literature) but rather what strategies one can
formulate using a specic type of knowledge and how such strategies impact the
performance of individuals and groups.
The framework allows methodical experimental comparative studies across dier-
ently composed groups of agents with varying ability levels and individual strategies.
Individual performance can be measured by individual average scores from a com-
pleted tournament, in case of groups of same size and similar structure, or by an ap-
proximate measure called `adjusted average' that is readily comparable across groups
of dierent sizes. Group performance may be measured by a `social welfare' function
such as the group average or the group adjusted average, or by a `failure rate' based on
an adopted threshold representing the minimum acceptable individual performance.
This allows the experimenter to examine the prole of each individual strategy with
respect to its impact upon the individual and group performance. As an illustration,
we provide experimental studies of six dierent group compositions and observation
of how individual strategies perform in dierent contexts.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. We review the background and other
related work together with their limitations in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we outline
and motivate the problem that we intend to address in this research. We present the
models and the simulation framework including its requirements denitions, structure,
and behaviour in Chapter 4. The experimental results, analysis and evaluation are
presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and future work.
4
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter presents the necessary background information and an overview of re-
lated previous work in multiagent systems, the evolution of cooperation, game theory,
normal-form games, Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), PD tournament structures, and PD
evolutionary models.
2.1 Multiagent Systems
Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2009] dene multiagent systems as \systems that include
multiple autonomous entities with either diverging information or diverging interests
or both." In another study by Wooldridge [2009] that focused mostly on articial
systems, multiagent systems are dened as \systems in which many rational and in-
telligent agents interact with each other in an environment."
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By denition, an agent according to [Ferber and Weiss, 1999] \can be a physical
or virtual entity that can act, perceive its environment (in a partial way) and commu-
nicate with others, is autonomous and has skills to achieve its goals and tendencies."
Russell and Norvig [2010] in another study consider agents to be rational entities and
therefore dene a rational agent as \one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome
or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome."
In general, agents are autonomous entities that act upon their environment to sat-
isfy their design objectives. Apart from their autonomous behaviour, there are other
characteristics that dene agents. Wooldridge and Jennings [1999] identify common
characteristics of agents such as responding to changes in their environment (reactiv-
ity), ability to initiate goals, plans and perform goal-oriented actions (proactiveness)
and the capability to communicate with other agents or human entities within or
outside their environments (social ability).
According to Russell and Norvig [2010], the environments that agents might be sit-
uated in can have some general properties that are used in their classication. For
instance, an environment may be deterministic or non-deterministic. A deterministic
environment is one in which the next state of the environment is completely deter-
mined by the current state and the action executed by the agent. A non-deterministic
environment is one in which the actions of agents on the environment in a given state
may result in dierent possible outcomes, but no probabilities are attached to them.
An environment is static if it can change only as a result of agent's action, or dynamic
if it can change due to other processes that inuence the environment beyond the
agent's control [Russell and Norvig, 2010]. An environment is considered accessible if
the agent can obtain complete information about the environment, and inaccessible
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otherwise. An environment is classied as discrete when the sets of possible actions
and percepts are nite and xed, or continuous otherwise [Parsons and Wooldridge,
2002].
2.2 Evolution of Cooperation
Political scientist Robert Axelrod and evolutionary biologist Hamilton used game-
theoretic modelling to demonstrate how cooperation arises among members of the
same species and even among dierent species [Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981]. Evo-
lution of cooperation studies how within a population of self-interested individuals
cooperation can emerge and persist [Axelrod, 2006]. Over the years, studies on the
evolution of cooperation have seen applications in elds such as economics [Friedman,
1998], political science [Axelrod, 2006], evolutionary biology [Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981], and multiagent systems. A formal framework to study the evolution of coop-
eration is game theory, and in particular its developing sub-discipline of evolutionary
game theory [Weibull, 1997].
2.3 Game Theory
Game theory, formally introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944], studies
interactions between self-interested agents and further provides the necessary analysis
to determine how a player should act in a given situation [Aumann, 1989]. Applica-
tions of game theory are being recognized in elds such as economics [Owen, 2013],
evolutionary biology [Ernst, 2009], and more recently in multiagent encounters where
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the overall outcome depends critically on the choices made by all agents in the sce-
nario [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009]. Also, principles from game theory could be
applied in developing cooperative and competitive multiagent systems [Pendharkar,
2012].
Games discussed in this study belong to the class of non-cooperative games, which
means they model interactions of individual self-interested players which receive indi-
vidual payos as a result of the game. In Non-Cooperative Game Theory, we consider
the decision theory for more than one agent and all agents act autonomously with-
out any binding agreements. The key assumption is that every player's goal is to
maximize its individual payo. Depending on the game structure this may lead to
adversarial relations (as in zero-sum games), cooperation (as in coordination games),
or in most cases to interactions with elements of both conict and cooperation.1
Denition 2.3.1: (Normal-Form Game) According to Shoham and Leyton-Brown
[2009] A (nite, n - person) normal-form game is a tuple (N, A, u), where :
 N is a nite set of n players, indexed by i;
 A = A1      An, where Ai is a nite set of actions available to player i.
Each vector a = (ai; : : : ; an) 2 A is called an action prole.
 u = (u1; : : : ; un) where ui : A 7! IR is a real-valued utility (or payo) function
for player i
A two-player normal-form game with two strategy options, called Cooperate and De-
fect, can be represented by a 2  2 payo matrix, as shown in Table 2.1. The row
1In this study, games are not necessary viewed as adversarial, and so we prefer to use the term
\partner" instead of \opponent."
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Player i
Player j
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (bi; bj) (di; aj)
Defect (ai; dj) (ci; cj)
Table 2.1: Payo-matrix representation of a 2 x 2 game in normal-form
player i and column player j receive the payo bi and bj respectively when they both
cooperate. Similarly, when they both defect player i receives ci and player j receives
cj. In the case where player i defects while player j is trying to cooperate, player
i gets the payo ai and player j gets the payo dj. On the other hand, if player j
defects while player i is cooperating then player i gets di as the payo and player j
gets aj as his payo [Beckenkamp et al., 2007].
The two-player matrix game in normal-form shown in Table 2.1 becomes the Pris-
oner's Dilemma game if and only if the following conditions are met for both player
i's and j's payos:
a > b > c > d (2.1)
and
2b > a+ d (2.2)
A normal-form game can exist as either symmetric or asymmetric. According to
Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2009] a two-player two-action normal-form game is called
a symmetric game if it has the form:
A B
A x,x u,v
B v,u y,y
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The requirements of symmetric games are that players do not have distinct roles in
the game and that the payos of individual players do not depend on their identities.
Based on this denition, one can say that the general 2  2 game in normal-form
presented in Table 2.1 is symmetric when the indexed payos are equivalent to each
other (example, ai = aj;_i 6= j) [Beckenkamp et al., 2007].
However, in the asymmetric case, the payo for a player does depend on their iden-
tities and players do have distinct roles. Considering the general 2  2 game in
normal-form presented in Table 2.1, one possible way it can exist in asymmetric form
is when at least one of the payos ai to di diers from the corresponding payo in aj
to dj [Beckenkamp et al., 2007].
Prisoner's Dilemma: The narrative of the Prisoner's Dilemma describes two ar-
rested criminal suspects that are placed in separate rooms with no way to communi-
cate with each other. Without knowing the other's intention, each player has to make
a decision whether to betray (Defect) or remain silent (Cooperate) [Wooldridge and
Jennings, 1999]. The rewards and conditions for the Prisoner's Dilemma game are
shown in Figure 2.1. The highest reward is defection when partner cooperates and
C(2) D(2)
C(1) R R S T
D(1) T S P P
where
T >R >P >S
2R >(T + S)
Figure 2.1: The Payo Matrix of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game
the lowest rewarded is cooperation when the partner defects. The rewards for mutual
cooperation (R, R) are higher than the rewards for mutual defection (P, P). When one
player cooperates and the other defects, the defector gets the highest payo, T, and
the cooperator gets the lowest, S. Defection is the dominant strategy, which means
that regardless of the other player's choice, the defecting player will do as well or bet-
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ter by defecting than by cooperating. Mutual defection is the only Nash Equilibrium,
meaning that defection is always the best response to defection by the other player.
The only Pareto Optimal strategy prole will be to mutually cooperate; this means
that we cannot move from mutual cooperation to any other strategy prole without
making any player worse o.
An iterated version of the PD game is called Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). In
the classical IPD game, players face each other in repeated encounters and therefore
have to choose their mutual strategic actions (Cooperation or Defection) repeatedly
with the sole motive of increasing their payos. The main assumption of the IPD
game is that each competing player is totally unaware of the partner's thoughts ex-
cept for the moves made by the partner during their previous encounters, which the
player may or may not keep in its internal memory depending on its strategy.
2.4 PD Tournament Structures
2.4.1 Axelrod's Tournament
The IPD was rst formalized as a public tournament in 1980 by Axelrod to study
how cooperation will evolve among self-interested agents. The Axelrod's tournament
has since been perceived as the standard model for the evolution of cooperation [Ax-
elrod, 2006]. In the tournament, each of the n players meet each other player exactly
once and in that meeting plays a long series of PD games [Axelrod, 2006]. In the
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Axelrod's tournament, varied participating strategies competed against one another
and, \Tit-For-Tat", a simple strategy where a player cooperates rst, and then for
subsequent games duplicates the partner's last known action emerged as the winner.
Analyses have shown that the success of \Tit-For-Tat" could be mostly attributed to
the presence of other strategies in the tournament that were more inclined to cooper-
ate [Axelrod, 2006].
Axelrod's tournament scheduling, when compared to real life situations where PD
game theory might apply has two unrealistic assumptions. These are the absence of
information about the behaviour of players other than the current partner, and the
scheduling of games where each participant plays a long series of PD games against a
single partner and never meets the same partner again [Axelrod, 2006].
2.4.2 Random Scheduling Tournaments
Variations of IPD redene the settings under which players compete with one another.
Random scheduling abstraction proposes an arrangement where players are randomly
matched against one another to compete in an IPD tournament. Random scheduling
was implemented by Takahashi [2010] to study the sustainability of cooperation in a
large community when players are uniformly randomly matched in repeated encoun-
ters. Players in each round decide whether to cooperate or defect independent of
their own past actions but refer to the given immediate past action of their sched-
uled partners. The results of the study by Takahashi was that in uniformly randomly
matched encounters cooperation can be sustained by an equilibrium [Takahashi, 2010].
In another study, Heller and Mohlin [2016] showed that cooperation can still be sus-
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tained in randomly matched repeated PD environments when in every encounter
players are given a xed number of random partner's past actions without an as-
sumed time zero at which interaction starts. Observations from the study by Heller
and Mohlin was that in random encounters cooperation could evolve and persist even
among players that are committed to specic strategies.
An actual experiment was conducted at Jiatong University's Smith Economic Lab,
Shanghai, by Chong et al. [2007] to investigate how information and reputation help
induce cooperation in a random-matched IPD game. In their research, 144 under-
graduate students were divided into groups of 12 and randomly matched to play 60
rounds of IPD with a payo structure similar to the classic Axelrod's tournament
but with a higher incentive for defection and an ability to request up to 10 levels of
partner's preceding actions. The experimental results indicate that players are more
cooperative towards partners that have a high reputation to cooperate.
2.4.3 Round-Robin Tournament Scheduling
A complete round-robin tournament of n agents is a tournament in which every agent
plays the remaining n - 1 agents. Compared to other scheduling abstractions such
as Single Elimination tournaments where pairs of players are matched according to
an initial seeding, and the winners of these pairs advance to the next round, while
the losers are eliminated after a single loss [Kim et al., 2017], or the Double Elimi-
nation tournament where no player is eliminated until he has lost two games [Glenn,
1960], round-robin tournament scheduling provides equal advantage or opportunity
for every player to meet all other partners in the game without any form of elimination.
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Also, the round-robin tournament scheduling is considered to be the fairest way to
schedule competitions since there are no elements of luck nor arbitrariness. The nal
results of round-robin tournaments are accurate because the scheduling abstraction
presents results of long period interactions against equal competitions. [Rasmussen
and Trick, 2008].
2.4.4 Iterated Round-Robin Tournament Scheduling
The Iterated Round-Robin tournament (IRRT) scheduling abstraction describes a re-
peated version of the round-robin tournament where each participant meets all other
players in turns for a xed number of times and for each round they play a single PD
game. Various studies into repeated round-robin tournaments have been performed
to analyze dierent forms of repeated Prisoner Dilemma games. One of such is the
study by Kretz [2011] which explored the development of cooperation among dierent
agent strategies with varying memory capacities and payo structures.
Kretz [2011] implements the Iterated Round-Robin Tournament scheduling to inves-
tigate how cooperation and defection will emerge for dierent numbers of iterations,
payo matrices, and memory sizes of strategies in a study on the emergence of co-
operative behaviour. Through computer simulations, the scheduling discipline is a
modied Iterated Round-Robin Tournament where strategies play with partners and
themselves but with knowledge of up to three levels of the most recent preceding
actions of future partners and up to two levels of their own. The conclusion is that
payo matrices have much inuence on strategies' performances and also aect the
evolution of cooperation. The study restricts the look-up of a partner's past moves to
only three levels, and strategies lack the opportunity to autonomously decide on the
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number of partner's past moves required to make a decision.
2.5 PD Evolutionary Models
Dierent studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma game consider the impact of information
gathering on the evolution of cooperation. The Axelrod's tournament assumes that
each competing player is only concerned with the current partner and once the iter-
ated encounter with the same partner ends the player loses all information acquired
from the interactions and move on to compete against another competitor. However,
there are other models that study the impact of information gathering.
Kretz [2011] in his research considered a model that studies the evolution of co-
operation among articial agent strategies in a repeated round-robin tournament of
the PD game. A strategy with a memory size n has n+1 sub-strategies to dene the
action in the rst, second, . . .nth, and any further iteration.
Players are given knowledge of up to three levels of the most recent preceding ac-
tions of their future partners and up to two levels of their own most recent actions.
At the end of every tournament, agents whose total payos are below the overall aver-
age payo are eliminated while the remaining agents evolve into the next tournament
of the competition. The evolutionary tournament ends if only one strategy remains
or all remaining strategies have the same cumulative payos.
Kretz [2011] in his study observed the results of evolution of dierent strategies for
dierent levels of Own-to-Opponent memories.
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In all simulation experiments, there were 10,000 iterations of the round-robin tour-
nament and the results showed that dierent agent strategies emerged winners for
dierent levels of memory combinations and utility payos.
Grinberg et al. [2010] also propose a model to study the evolution of cooperation
among human participants. The main aim of that model is to represent and to pre-
dict existing game dynamics and also study the evolution of cooperation among 10
participants randomly paired to play 100 rounds of the PD Game.
These individuals are randomly assigned 5 agent strategies and competed at dierent
Cooperative Index (CI) levels from 0.1 to 0.9. The CI level of a game is dened to
be (R - P) / (T - S). Using agents' total payos and the number of mutual coopera-
tions as measures of success, agents evolve after every 100 rounds of play and the top
5 agents procreate and proceed to the next tournament whilst the bottom 5 agents
are eliminated. Grinberg et al. [2010] argue that with the ability for agents to pre-
dict future subjective payos for both cooperation and defection moves there will be
a strong positive correlation between CI levels and evolution of cooperation among
independent self-interested agents.
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Chapter 3
Problem Statement
Advancements in distributed intelligent systems have enabled us to delegate increas-
ingly complex tasks to heterogeneous multiagent systems that may involve software
agents and robots of various types in interactions that usually include cooperative
behaviour. In particular, this motivates investigation into how a society of inde-
pendently designed articial agents can be constructed to perform a specic task in a
dynamic environment whose behaviour is not fully predictable. Such agents should be
self-interested enough to ensure that their design objectives are achieved (individual
success) but must be enabled to proactively develop cooperation through interactions
with other members of the society in order to achieve the overall group goal (group
success).
The predominant part of modelling and simulation research on the development of co-
operation in multiagent systems has been based on game-theoretic concepts, primarily
on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), and to a lesser extent on other two-player games (for
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example, public goods [Santos et al., 2008], snow drift [Souza et al., 2009]). To the
best of our knowledge most such studies have emphasized either individual success
([Axelrod, 2006], [Kretz, 2011]) or group success ([Santos et al., 2008]). There have
not been many studies that balance these two performance criteria. Yet in practical
task-oriented systems individual and group success are often closely related, com-
plement and inuence each other. Our study aims at combining both measures of
success within a single model and exploring both types of system performance within
the same setup of a simulation experiment.
In many practical systems, the participating agents will have dierent levels of ability
and methods of decision making. This is not adequately reected in existing systems
of game theoretic studies. Some models (for example, [Ridinger and McBride, 2016])
include abilities conducive to better strategy choices but do not model the skills rele-
vant to eciency in mainstream activities. Yet we observe that in many agent groups
such mainstream abilities of individual agents impact the interaction patterns and the
resulting individual and group success.
An illustrative example that motivates our research is a class of students in a software
course, where each individual develops a piece of software to the same specication
(for example, a compiler for a specied language), done as a sequence of phases. The
students are allowed to cooperate by exchanging testing strategies and test cases, with
the intent to speed up the group progress. Thus, the progress in design and coding is
measured individually and reects the individual's ability, while the progress in test-
ing depends also on the patterns of cooperation among players of varying individual
abilities. The total progress of an individual in class is a balanced combination of the
two components.
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In each phase of the project, any two students have an opportunity to interact, anal-
ogous to a round-robin tournament; and since the project has a sequence of phases,
an Iterated Round-Robin Tournament (IRRT) arises as a natural encounter schedule.
This is one of many examples where for realistic modelling of repetitive interactions
IRRT emerges as preferable to the widely used Axelrod tournament [Axelrod, 2006]
pattern, in which each pair of players meet once and play a long series of games.
We further note that the example motivates eorts to develop strategies that en-
hance both individual and group success. While individual success may naturally be
measured by players' individual scores, group success could be measured in a number
of ways. Immediate possibilities in the current example are the class average score
(that is, the `social welfare' concept of game theory) and a low failure rate with re-
spect to an established failure threshold modelling the minimum acceptable level of
individual success.
In realistic agent societies where there are cooperation and defection interactions,
it is possible that agents may acquire a certain level of knowledge about their part-
ners and may use such information to achieve their objectives. We intend to introduce
and study the impact of information gathering among dierent combinations of agent
strategies. Most models in the reviewed literature implement information gather-
ing through direct observance of partner's action during interactions (for example,
[Axelrod, 2006]) or access to a central historical repository (for example, [Takahashi,
2010], [Kretz, 2011], [Grinberg et al., 2010]). Our study includes strategies based on
knowledge of other agents' properties but does not address the underlying knowledge
acquisition mechanisms. We are interested in the strategic eect of information gath-
19
ering and not concerned with the mechanisms and techniques of acquiring information.
When pursuing the above research ideas in a game-theoretic setting, we note spe-
cic limitations of the Prisoner's Dilemma as the basic underlying game structure.
The rst observation is that all scoring in PD-based models typically comes from
interaction, while progress in real systems may also be achieved through individual
activity without interaction. Second, central to the dilemma in question is the fact
that mutual cooperation is more rewarding than mutual defection while an even higher
reward is collected by defecting against the cooperator, with the latter facing the low-
est payo. This ranking of interaction payos may not be realistic in all contexts.
In particular, when agents perform their mainstream tasks individually, with varying
abilities, they may or may not benet from a specic instance of mutual cooperation
(as might occur in the illustrative example above).
The main objective of this research is to establish a game-theoretic modelling and
simulation framework that supports methodical experimental exploration of how dif-
ferent strategies of cooperation vs. defection impact both individual and group success
in multiagent systems with dierent agent abilities. The agents perform individual
activities and also interact with other agents, with both components contributing to
their individual scores. The two-player game chosen to model the basic encounter
must incorporate the inuence of individual abilities upon player payos. The design
of agents' behaviour should allow advanced strategies that take advantage of knowl-
edge about partners' properties (notably, their strategies or individual abilities). The
framework should let the experimenter evaluate the performance of dierent strategies
with respect to their impact upon individual or group success, and also compare how
a specic strategy performs in groups with dierent strategy compositions.
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Chapter 4
The Modelling and Simulation
Framework
This chapter presents an asymmetric two-player cooperation game, its model design,
and the architecture of the software simulator used to implement the game. Section 4.1
describes the Ability-based Cooperation (ABC) game and the Extended ABC (EABC)
game as dened in [Polajnar and Polajnar, 2018]. The architecture of the simulator
in terms of its requirements (purpose, denition, functional and non-functional, and
component requirements) is explained in Section 4.2. Following that, we consider the
structure of the simulator in Section 4.3 and present the behaviour of the dierent
components of the simulator architecture in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 details some notes
on simulator implementation while Section 4.6 elaborates our dierent approaches to
experimentation.
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4.1 The Ability-Based Two-Player Games
4.1.1 Introduction
The Ability-based Cooperation (ABC) game is an asymmetric two-payer game derived
from the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), in which the payos depend on the abilities of
participating players. In general, an ABC game is derived from a \base" PD game and
an assignment of abilities to players. As in PD, the players of ABC choose between
cooperation and defection, but the payos depend on players' abilities, and thus the
ability distribution impacts the player motivation and outcomes. An ABC's payo
matrix may itself behave like PD in parts of the game's parameter space. We further
introduce and study the notion of Extended ABC (EABC) game in which players
pursue ability-based individual activities and also interact through the ABC game.
4.1.2 Motivation
The general idea is that in a system of n agents with dierent abilities, each agent
performs an individual activity whose reward is proportional to the agent's ability.
In addition, the agents interact with each other playing an asymmetric two-player
game in which they can cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payos for cooperation or
defection are inuenced by the abilities of the individual partners. The total agent's
score is a weighted sum of its earnings through individual activity and its payos from
the interactions with other players.
For an illustrative example consider a class of students in a software course, where
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each individual develops a piece of software to same specication (for example, a
compiler for a specied language), done as a sequence of phases. The progress in
design and coding is individual and reects the individual ability. The students are
allowed to cooperate by exchanging testing strategies and test cases, with the intent
to speed up the group progress and add a cooperative dimension to the software devel-
opment activity. The progress in testing thus partly depends on cooperation patterns.
In game-theoretic terms, the class activity can be represented as an iterated tourna-
ment of scheduled mutual EABC encounters, with each project phase corresponding to
an iteration. In each encounter, a student can receive test information from the other
player (C) or receive nothing (D); likewise, the student can provide test information
to the other player (C) or provide nothing (D). The model establishes a framework
for comparative studies of how dierent ability-based strategies impact cooperation
and how they aect the individual and group success in a multiagent system.
4.1.3 The Ability-based Cooperation (ABC) game
Denition
An ABC game is constructed from a given Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game G, with
ability values assigned to its players. The construction is as follows:
We adopt as the base PD game any Prisoner's Dilemma game for players i and j:
Player j
C D
Player i C R, R S, T
D T, S P, P
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that satises the following two conditions:
T > R > P > S = 0 (4.1)
2R > S + T (4.2)
Next, we assign positive real values ai and aj, called abilities, to the players i and
j respectively.
Then the ABC game Gij is the two-player game with the following payo matrix:
Player j
C D
Player i C ajR; aiR S; aiR + ajP
D ajR + aiP; S aiP; ajP
Interpretation
The ABC game represents a situation in which each player pursues an individual
activity and also interacts with the other player. The ABC game formally describes
the interaction and resulting payo. The Extended ABC (EABC) game, to be dened
next, also includes the scores from the individual activity, and denes a balanced
sum of individual activity score and the ABC game payo as the total score. The
intuitive motivation and interpretation for the ABC game denition are situated in
that context.
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4.1.4 The Extended Ability-based Cooperation (EABC) game
Denition
An EABC game Eij is a quadruple
Eij = (G; ai; aj; )
where G is a base PD game, ai and aj are positive real numbers representing player
abilities, and  2 [0, 1] is the balancingfactor.
The triple (G; ai; aj) is used to construct the ABC game Gij. The score of player i is
then dened as
s
(j)
i = ai + (1  )p(j)i (4.3)
where p
(j)
i is the i
0s payo from its Gij game with j, and the value of  is used to
balance the relative impact of the two components.
4.1.5 The Design of ABC Payo Matrix
Let G be a PD game with payo parameters T > R > P > S = 0. For each pair of
players (i; j) , the asymmetric game Gij is dened with payos for i as follows:
25
Rij = ajR
The idea is that the higher the ability of the cooperation
partner j, the higher is the i0s reward for mutual
cooperation with that partner
Pij = aiP
By not engaging in cooperation, the player i saves some
resources (for example, time) that can be used for individual
progress, commensurate with i0s ability (as expressed
by the coecient ai).
Tij = ajR + aiP
When i defects while j cooperates, i gets both the advantage
of j0s cooperation (as in Rij above) and the
advantage of own non-engagement (as in Pij above).
Sij = 0
i does not benet from this situation; all other payos
are positive.
The denitions of Rji; Pji; Tji; and Sji (the payos for j) are symmetric to the
above.
4.1.6 Game analysis
The ABC game has been derived from Prisoner's Dilemma and bears some similar-
ity to it. Unlike the usual version of PD, ABC is asymmetric; however, asymmetric
versions of PD have also been studied [Ahn et al., 2007, Sheposh and Gallo Jr., 1973,
Murnighan, 1991].
The rst question is when ABC is actually an asymmetric PD. According to the
denition of asymmetric PD [Beckenkamp et al., 2007], ABC will be PD when all of
the following conditions hold:
Tij > Rij > Pij > Sij Tji > Rji > Pji > Sji (4.4)
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2Rij > Tij + Sij 2Rji > Tji + Sji (4.5)
After the substitution of values from the ABC payo matrix denition, it immedi-
ately follows that all four conditions in (4.4, 4.5) hold if and only if the following two
conditions hold:
ajR > aiP aiR > ajP (4.6)
One can thus formulate the following result:
Proposition 1. Let Gij be an ABC game whose base payo values for mutual co-
operation and mutual defection are R and P respectively, and whose player abilities
are ai and aj. Then Gij is an instance of Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma if and only if
P
R
<
ai
aj
<
R
P
(4.7)
Let us now consider a round-robin tournament with n players (n > 1), where each
player i plays one EABC game with every other player j according to a predened
tournament schedule. All players' ability values belong to an interval [ a, a], where
a > 0. The next proposition is immediate from (4.7).
Proposition 2. Consider a set of n agents (n > 1), playing in a round-robin
tournament based on EABC games. Let each player i have the ability ai 2 [a; a],
where a > a > 0. If
a
a
<
R
P
(4.8)
then every ABC game played in the tournament is an Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma
game.
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4.2 Simulator Architecture
4.2.1 The Purpose of the Simulator
The purpose of our discrete-event simulator is to provide the framework necessary
for the experimentation of a specic agent-based model involving the interaction of
multiple agents engaged in a two-player asymmetric game structured in a round-robin
tournament. This is a research simulator composed of dierent modules some of which
have been developed and implemented in other previous studies.
4.2.2 Simulator Requirements
The list of requirements for the simulator is divided into two main categories: func-
tional requirements, and non-functional requirements. In the rest of this section,
dierent components of each category are described.
Requirements Denition
The requirements of the simulator outlined in this study provide an abstract descrip-
tion of the services provided by the simulator and the constraints under which the
simulator operates. The requirements denition has been categorized into two dier-
ent kinds: functional requirements and non-functional requirements. The remainder
of this section elaborates each of these requirements denition in the context of the
simulator described.
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Functional Requirements of the Simulator
The functional requirements of the simulator consider the requirements that are re-
lated to the conceptual functions of the simulator without considering how the features
are interoperated. The Use Case diagram shown in Figure 4.1 describes the functional
requirements of the simulator.
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Set Up and Run
Simulation
Display Simulation
Results
Display Graph of
Simulation Results
Display Simulation
Log
Display Simulation
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Results
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Start Simulation
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Figure 4.1: A Use Case representation of Simulator
1. Set up and Run Simulation: The experimenter should be able to set up and
run a number of dierent simulation experiment to study the results of dierent
measures of success. To set up and run simulation may include the following:
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(a) Set up Simulation: This includes;
i. Agent Parameters: The experimenter should be able to select the de-
sired number of agents required to run in the simulation experiment
and assign to each agent its level of ability.
ii. Tournament Structures Parameters: The experimenter of the simula-
tor must be able to choose the number of tournament iterations for
each experiment, base payo matrix, and balancing factor.
iii. Game Parameters: The simulation environment shall comply with
other game parameters such as information gathering approach and
the approach to evolution specied per each experiment.
(b) Run Simulation: The experimenter will be able to run a simulation exper-
iment. This functional requirement includes the ability of the simulator to
start and stop the simulation experiment any time at the request of the
experimenter in order to observe simulation results. Also, the simulator
shall comply with the experimenter's decision to step through the simula-
tion experiment. To step through the simulation run means the simulator
simulates one round and then stores a snapshot for that round until the
experimenter decides to perform another step, run, or stop simulation.
(c) Save Simulation: The experimenter shall be able to save the results of
simulation experiments in terms of agents' performance as a statistics, pro-
gressive charts, or simulation logs.
2. Display Simulation Results: The experimenter should be able to display the
results of each simulation experiment. The Use Case depiction of this functional
requirement includes the following:
(a) Display Graph of Simulation Results: The simulator shall be able to comply
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with the experimenter's request to display a graphical representation of the
simulation results indicating for each tournament agents' score, average
score, maximum and minimum scores.
(b) Display Simulation Logs: The simulator shall upon request from the ex-
perimenter provide access to a log of agents' actions, strategies, and scores.
(c) Display Measures of Success Results: The experimenter of the simulator
should be able to view the results for dierent measures of success such as
individual and group success.
Non-Functional Requirements of the Simulator
The non-functional requirements of the simulator dene the qualitative specications
including its properties and constraints on the simulator as a whole. These require-
ments ensure the simulator's quality and maintainability [Sommerville, 2011]. The
simulator described in this thesis meets the non-functional requirements of Eciency
and the potential ability to execute Parallel Runs. The eciency of the simulator
measures its productivity while parallel runs ensure faster simulation executions.
4.2.3 Structure of the Simulator
The high-level design of the simulator is described in this sub-section. We explore
the organization of interrelated elements of the simulator to provide the basis for its
detailed design and implementation.
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Figure 4.2: High-Level Structure of the Simulator
The structure of the simulator can be divided into eight main components. These
are the User Interface (UI), Experiment Manager(EM), SetUp Repository (SR), Simu-
lation Engine (SE), Results Repository (RR), Historical Information Manager (HIM),
Historical Information Repository (HIR), and Agent as shown in Figure 4.2.
User Interface (UI)
As a very important component of the simulator's design, the User Interface executes
actively to ensure an easy, and interactive use of the simulator by the experimenter.
Before a simulation experiment, the User Interface provides an Input Interface for the
experimenter to set up the number of agents, assign agents' strategies, and initialize
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or update other simulation setup parameters in the SetUp Repository. At the end
of simulation, the experimenter can use the Results Interface sub-component of User
Interface to query and display specic results of the simulation. Figure 4.3 shows the
interrelated components of the User Interface.
User Interface 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input Interface
Results Interface
EM
Setup Repository Results Repository
Instruction
Data
Experimenter
Figure 4.3: Structure of the User Interface
Experiment Manager (EM)
The Experiment Manager upon activation from the User Interface performs the func-
tion of validating assigned strategies, setting up ability levels and other simulation
input parameters stored in the Setup Repository. At the end of each experiment, the
Experiment Manager retrieves the results from the Simulation Engine and stores in
the Result repository to be displayed to the Experimenter.
The Experiment Manager can be functionally divided into two sub-components as
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shown in Figure 4.4. These are Agents Setup Manager and Parameter Conguration
Manager.
The Agents Setup Manager validates the number of agents in the experiment and also
ensures that there is an accurate assignment of strategies and agents' ability levels as
specied by the experimenter in the setup repository. The Parameter Conguration
Manager, on the other hand validates and assigns all other parameter inputs of the
simulation environment such as payo matrix, number of tournaments iterations, and
the balancing factor stored in the setup repository.
These validated inputs and assigned parameters are then sent to the Simulation En-
gine and Agent components respectively to begin the experiment. In the case of an
invalid simulation input, the Experiment Manager alerts the experimenter through
the User Interface to make the necessary corrections to invalid input parameters be-
fore the simulation begins.
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Figure 4.4: Structure of the Experiment Manager
SetUp Repository (SR)
The SetUp Repository (SR) serves as a storage component for conguration values.
Inputs for the experiment are stored in the Setup Repository to be accessed by Exper-
iment Manager for validation and assignments before simulation experiments begin.
4.2.4 Simulation Engine (SE)
The design of the Simulation Engine (SE) shown in Figure 4.5 assumes an active
simulation component capable of supporting concurrent discrete-event simulation of
our model dened in Section 4.1. Its main responsibility is to begin and control the
execution of simulation experiments after receiving the input and a signal from the
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Experiment Manager.
For each simulation run, the Simulation Engine kickstarts by activating the Sched-
uler. The Scheduler plans events for execution and also provides the arrangement for
agents to compete at their assigned time-steps while ensuring that the round-robin
scheduling abstraction adopted for this model is maintained. The agent interaction
schedule created by the scheduler is then made available to all other sub-components
of the Simulation Engine.
For each tournament in the simulation experiment, the Tournament Handler com-
ponent determines the total number of rounds of games that must be played based
on the number of agents competing in the tournament. In addition, the Tournament
Handler ensures that each agent participates in equal encounters before proceeding
to the next tournament or end of the simulation. In every tournament, agents engage
in r rounds of encounters. The Round Handler is responsible for ensuring that for
each round in a specic tournament participants are paired with dierent partners.
Also, the Round Handler manages agents' performance and pay-o proles for each
round.
The Match Manager provides the capacity for encounters scheduled in each round
to be executed independent of one another. Also, it ensures that the right scores are
assigned to every agent in the simulation experiment based on their actions and the
payo matrix. The Match Manager after every encounter stores information on agent
ids, abilities, strategies, actions, and scores in the Historical Information Repository
through the Historical Information Manager and in the Results repository through
the Experiment Manager.
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Figure 4.5: Structure of the Simulation Engine
Historical Information Manager (HIM)
At the end of every encounter, the Historical Information Manager (HIM) receives the
scores, and actions of the paired agents from Simulation Engine in order to update
the Historical Information Repository. Furthermore, this active component of the
simulator serves the function of responding to all queries by agents pertaining to
information on current or future partners.
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Historical Information Repository (HIR)
The Historical Information Repository (HIR) is basically a storage unit for all strate-
gies, abilities, scores, and past actions of agents in the simulation experiment. This
passive component is updated at the end of every round by the Historical Information
Manager. Information stored in the Historical Information Repository can only be
accessed by agents after submitting requests to the Historical Information Manager.
Agent
An agent in this model describes a goal-oriented, autonomous, and intelligent compo-
nent of the simulator that competes by submitting actions to the Simulation Engine
in every scheduled encounter. During every encounter against a partner, the agent
perceives, reasons, and performs an action upon request from the Simulation Engine.
In order to take an optimal action as to whether to cooperate or defect against a
scheduled partner, the agent may request information about the partner, or other
agents in the tournament by submitting a request to the Historical Information Man-
ager. After this, the agent refers to its strategy algorithm and acts appropriately in
order to achieve its desired goals. Figure 4.6 shows the interrelated components of
the agent component.
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Figure 4.6: Agent Reasoning Architecture
4.2.5 Behaviour of the Simulator
This section of the study discusses the behaviour of various essential components
of the simulator. The behaviour of elements such as Simulation Engine (SE), User
Interface (UI), and Agent will be analyzed in the context of their functions, control
operators, inputs and outputs.
Simulation Engine
The design of the simulator follows steps of discrete events decomposed into a num-
ber of encounters that are executed in each round of a tournament by the Simulation
Engine. The number of encounters scheduled per round and the number of rounds
played in each tournament typically depend on the number of agents in an experi-
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ment run. At the beginning of the experiment, agents selected by the experimenter
are assigned their initial strategies broadly categorized into Naive Cooperators, Naive
Defectors, Selective Cooperators, and Limited Cooperators (Fixed and Ratio). Apart
from the assignment of strategies, agents are also assigned individual ability levels.
These agents are then scheduled in a round-robin tournament that require them to
submit actions in every repeated round until the end of the experiment. In experi-
ments requiring multiple rounds, the simulator supports the ability of some agents to
request and retain summaries of partners' information. A general control structure
for the Simulation Engine is as shown in Figure 4.7;
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Figure 4.7: Nested Simulation Control Structure
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In a specic simulation experiment, the Simulation Engine begins its function
by activating the Scheduler which initializes current experiment conguration values
received from the Experiment Manager (EM). After this, the Scheduler assigns to
every agent an AgentId by which it is identied throughout the experiment. At the
end of the experiment, the Scheduler calculates agents' total scores, arranges their
performance in a leaderboard based on abilities, and signals the Experiment Manager
to store the results in the result repository while at the same requesting Experiment
Manager to submit conguration values for the next experiment. The Scheduler's
control structure is as shown in Figure 4.8
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Figure 4.8: Control Structure of Simulation Experiment
After setting up conguration values and scheduling agents, the Scheduler invokes
the Tournament Handler to initiate, coordinate, and control the activities of agents
for every tournament specied in the current experiment. In an experiment with n
players, the Tournament Handler ensures that there will be ( n
2
(n   1) ) number of
games for every tournament and each player participates in (n - 1 ) number of games
where n is always an even number value. At the end of a tournament, the Tournament
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Handler reports a summary statistics of the maximum score, average score, minimum
score, and players' progress. In multiple tournaments, the Tournament Handler en-
sures that all agents participate in equal number of games before initiating the next
tournament as shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Control Structure of a Tournament
A single tournament may consist of multiple rounds of encounters depending on
the number of agents. Each round is managed by the Round Handler which moni-
tors the activities of agents in every round. The Round Handler ensures that every
agent participates in a single encounter against a dierent partner in every round and
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submits a single action against its scheduled partner. The action could be either to
cooperate or defect. The control structure of the Round Handler is as shown in Figure
4.10.
Figure 4.10: Control Structure of a Round
Encounters between agents and their partners are controlled by theMatch Handler.
The Match Handler initializes a new encounter, schedules, and requests agents to
submit their actions. Based on agents' submitted actions, the Match Handler assigns
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scores to the respective agents. At the end of every scheduled encounter, the Match
Handler reports on the agents' strategies, actions, and scores. In addition, the Match
Handler returns the calculated scores to both agents. Figure 4.11 describes the ow
structure of the Match Handler and agents' actions during an encounter.
Figure 4.11: Control Structure of an encounter
The UI
The User Interface (UI) component of the simulator is responsible for providing in-
teractive access between the experimenter and the simulator. As an important com-
ponent of the simulator, the User Interface has the goal of ensuring an easy, ecient,
and user-friendly use of the system. The implementation design of this component
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has multiple tabs that perform dierent functions. These are About , Setup, Agent,
and Display. The functionalities of these components are briey explained below;
About
The About tab provides a brief description of the simulator, a list of agent strategies,
experiment's input parameters and other general information as shown in Figure 4.12
Figure 4.12: About component of the Simulator
47
Setup
The Setup tab which is mainly controlled by the Experiment Manager provides ac-
cess for the experimenter to dene, validate, and update the settings required for the
simulation experiment. Experiment settings specied in the Setup tab includes payo
values (Temptation to Defect, Reward, Sucker Punch, and Punishment for Defection),
Number of Tournaments, Information Request Limit, and Uncertainty Level that may
be varied to study their eects on agents' performances and the evolution of cooper-
ation. Alternatively, the experimenter may decide to upload the experiment's setup
using the Command Line Interface (CLI). Figure 4.13 shows the Setup tab of the
simulator.
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Figure 4.13: SetUp pane of the Simulator
Agent pane
This pane provides the experimenter access to specify the total number of agents in
the experiment as well as select the dierent strategies (Naive Cooperators, Naive
Defectors, Limited Cooperators (Fixed and Ratio), and Selective Cooperators.) that
must be assigned to agents. As shown in Figure 4.14, the agent pane also species
the minimum and maximum ability intervals. An experimenter may decide to specify
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the dierent ability levels.
Figure 4.14: Agent pane of the Simulator
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4.2.6 Approaches to Experimentation
The game-theoretic agent-based model described in this research provides the possibil-
ity to study through simulation experiments agents' strategic behaviour and measure
their success in terms of individual and group performance. We continue to exam-
ine these measures of success by considering the impact of certain agents' abilities
on the development of cooperation, and individual and group measures of success as
described in our ABC model. We also consider the comparable eect of information
gathering among agents with abilities in the dened EABC model.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Results and
Evaluation
This chapter presents results and evaluations of dierent simulation experiments con-
ducted using the Enhanced-ABC model dened in Section 4.1. Our evaluation of
agents' individual and group performance proles highlights the potential impact of
agents' abilities and information gathering on individual and collective group perfor-
mance.
Section 5.1 provides the denitions and parameter settings for dierent composition
of agent groups, game model details, and performance measures. In Section 5.2, we
continue to discuss our observations and analysis of dierent simulation experiments,
and then further our discussion with inter-group comparisons in Section 5.3. The
chapter concludes with an overall analysis of our observations in Section 5.4.
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5.1 Denitions and Parameter Settings
5.1.1 Composition of Agent Group
We explore 6 dierent compositions of agent groups representing the number of dif-
ferent simulation experiments conducted in this study. Each group structure consists
of n number of agents determined as a product of 6 dierent levels of abilities (12,
10, 8, 6, 4, 2) and a varying number of agent strategies. For example, a composition
of 6 ability levels and 2 agent strategies will result in a total of 12 agents. We dene
the dierent kinds of agent strategies below and Table 5.1 displays the compositions
of agent groups;
 Naive Cooperator: also known as NaiveC; always cooperates with its partner.
 Naive Defector : also called NaiveD in our experiments; defects in all situa-
tions against its partner.
 Selective Cooperator: has the capacity to determine if the partner is a de-
fector; the Selective Cooperator also called SelectiveC always defects against
Defector, but always cooperates otherwise.
 LimitedC-Fixed: also referred to as LimitedC-F can determine the partner's
ability; always cooperates if partner's ability is equal to or above a xed threshold
of 8, otherwise always defects.
 LimitedC-Ratio: shares some characteristics with the LimitedC-F strategy
and can determine the partner's ability. It always cooperates if ajR=aiP  1;
otherwise, it defects. This strategy is referred to as LimitedC-R in our simulation
experiments.
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Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
NaiveC
NaiveD
NaiveC
NaiveD
SelectiveC
NaiveC
NaiveD
LimitedC-F
NaiveC
NaiveD
LimitedC-R
NaiveC
NaiveD
SelectiveC
LimitedC-F
NaiveC
NaiveD
SelectiveC
LimitedC-R
Table 5.1: Compositions of Agent Groups
5.1.2 Game Model
Following the denitions detailed in Section 4.1.3 we adopt the base Prisoner's Dilemma
(PD) game in its symmetric form with payo values T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
to discuss the Ability-Based Cooperation (ABC). Unlike the classical PD game, the
ABC game has the payo values for a participating player i against a partner j as
Tij = ajR + aiP , Rij = ajR, Pij = aiP , Sij = 0 . The EABC includes the following
parameters;
 Agent's score: is the score agent i receives after an encounter with agent j. This
is dened as s
(j)
i = ai + (1  )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of agent i vs. j.
 Balancing factor : is a constant parameter  2 [0; 1] that regulates the relative
impact of the two components of the score, which are the ability component and
the payo. In all simulation experiments,  was set to 0.9.
 Round-Robin tournament structure: provides a schedule of pairwise encounters
that give equal advantage to every agent to meet all other partners in the game.
5.1.3 Performance Measures
In this study, we explore two measures of success; individual success and group success.
These are discussed separately below.
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Measures Individual of Success
Let the multiagent system consist of n = k  q agents, where k is the number of
strategies and q is the number of ability levels. Each agent i has the ability ai. Each
of the strategies is played by exactly one agent of each ability level.
For an agent i that has an ability ai we explore the following measures of individual
success:
 Total score: An agent i0s total score for the tournament is calculated as stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
 Average score: We dene the average score of an agent i as savgi = s
tot
i
n 1
 Adjusted total score: An agent i with ability ai has adjusted total score which is
calculated as the total score from all games with partners whose abilities dier
from ai. Formally, s
atot
i =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
 Adjusted average score: This is an approximate performance measure which
allows direct comparisons of the individual performance of an agent with given
ability and strategy across groups of dierent sizes. It is the adjusted total score
of an agent i divided by the number of games against partners whose abilities
dier from ai. Thus, s
aavg
i =
satoti
k(q 1) .
Measures Group of Success
For each group composed of agent strategies, we also examine the following measures
group of success:
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 Failure threshold : refers to the experimenter-set limit representing the minimum
acceptable level of individual performance. It is uniformly applied in all group
compositions in our study. In each experiment, we use the failure threshold to
determine the failure percentage.
 Failure percentage: is the percentage of agents in a group that falls below the
failure threshold. As a measure of group success, we compare the failure per-
centage between groups. A lower group failure percentage indicates a higher
group success and vice versa.
 Group total score: calculates the sum of the total scores for all agents in a
specic group structure. This measure of success provides a better approach
to compare group performance between compositions with an equal number of
agents, encounters, and strategies. It provides a better result to compare the
inuence of two or more dierent strategies in similar group structures.
 Group average score: is the sum of total scores for all agents in the group
structure divided by the number of agents. Used in similar conditions as the
group total score to compare the overall average performance among groups.
 Group adjusted total score: calculates the sum of the adjusted total scores for
all agents in a specic group structure. It only serves as an auxiliary measure
to derive group adjusted average score since it cannot be used as a performance
measure to compare group compositions of dierent size.
 Group adjusted average score: refers to the sum of the total adjusted scores for
all agents in the group structure divided by the number of agents. This measure
shows the overall average success of the group members in each composition.
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5.2 Observation and Analysis of Results
We present the simulation results and analyze our observations for dierent composi-
tions of group structures as follows.
5.2.1 Group Composition 1
Agents' Abilities
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Figure 5.1: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 1
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Individual Success
 Increasing the abilities of agents also increases their individual performance.
Thus, agents with higher abilities, in general, perform better than those with
lower abilities across the same strategy.
 Individually, Naive Cooperators at every ability level perform worse than Naive
Defectors. This follows from the easily veried fact that defection is the domi-
nant strategy in the ABC game (regardless of whether the game happens to be
an asymmetric PD).
 The gap between Naive Defectors and Naive Cooperators increases as abilities
grow. This is because i0s defection reward aiP increases with i0s own ability,
while i0s cooperation reward ajR is independent of i0s own ability.
Group Success
 At a general failing threshold of 5, we observe that none of the 12 agents fall
below the failing threshold. This is because lower ability Naive Defectors gain
more from exploiting Naive Cooperators while lower ability Naive Cooperators
gain from interaction reward with higher ability cooperators.
 The group adjusted average score for this composition is 98 representing a very
low group performance.
 Naive Cooperators do not fare well in this group because interaction reward for
cooperators is almost independent of player's own ability.
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5.2.2 Group Composition 2
Agents' Abilities
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Figure 5.2: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 2
Individual Success
 Naive Defectors with lower abilities ( 6) perform worse than all other agents
at the same levels. This is because Naive Defectors in this group structure face
defections from Selective Cooperators at all ability levels.
 The presence of Selective Cooperators increases the individual performance of
Naive Cooperators by doubling the number of their cooperating partners and
decreases the individual performance of Naive Defectors by doubling the number
of their defecting partners.
 We observe an increasing gap between Selective Cooperators and Naive Coop-
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erators because each Selective Cooperator defects against 1/3 of the population
with interaction gain proportional to its own ability.
Group Success
 The impact of Selective Cooperators reduces the overall group failure percentage.
 The group adjusted average score which is similar to social welfare in game
theory and represents the overall success of group members for this composition
of agents is 150.5.
 The increased group success is because Selective Cooperators cooperates with
2/3 of population irrespective of their ability levels.
 The most supportive environment for individual Naive Cooperators is when
there are Selective Cooperators.
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5.2.3 Group Composition 3
Agents' Abilities
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Figure 5.3: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 3
Individual Success
 Higher ability Naive Defectors perform better in this group than group 1 and 2
due to gains from interaction with both Naive Cooperators and LimitedC-Fixed
strategies at all levels.
 LimitedC-Fixed strategy reduces interaction gains of all lower ability agents and
causes them to record low individual performance.
 Naive Cooperators with abilities  8 gain from twice the number of cooperators
in this group than in group 1.
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 LimitedC-Fixed doesn't seem to be the best strategy in this composition be-
cause of its approach to cooperate or defect based on a xed ability threshold.
However, it is also not the worst strategy in this group structure.
Group Success
 Failure percentage is higher in this group than group 1 and 2 because LimitedC-
Fixed strategy defects against 1/2 of the population based on abilities.
 The group adjusted average score representing overall success of group members
in this composition is 146.1. This is slightly below the group performance of
composition 2 but higher than composition 1.
 The presence of LimitedC-Fixed strategy signicantly reduces the contribution
of low ability agents toward group success.
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5.2.4 Group Composition 4
Agents' Abilities
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Figure 5.4: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 4
Individual Success
 At a = 2, the Naive Defector performs slightly better due to the benet of
individual progress from non-interaction and cooperative behaviour from other
non-defectors with abilities  8.
 We observe a slight increasing gap between LimitedC-Ratio agents and Naive
Cooperators because LimitedC-Ratio agents with ability (a  10) lack the in-
centive to cooperate with lower ability agents when they can benet from both
partners' cooperation and individual reward for non-engagement.
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 Unlike LimitedC-Fixed agents in group 3, LimitedC-Ratio agents improve group
performance but record low individual scores.
Group Success
 Compared to group 2 the individually rational approach of LimitedC-Ratio
strategy toward cooperation and defection signicantly reduces the overall group
failure percentage.
 The group adjusted average score for this composition is 155.3. This is higher
than group 3 because the individually rational approach of LimitedC-Ratio
strategy increases overall group performance.
 Compared to group 3, this group records a higher contribution from low ability
agents toward group success due to the signicant impact of LimitedC-Ratio
strategy.
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5.2.5 Group Composition 5
Agents Abilities
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Figure 5.5: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 5
Individual Success
 Higher ability LimitedC-Fixed strategy is the best in this group because of gains
from cooperating with high ability cooperators and defecting gains against low
ability agents.
 The lowest ability Naive Defector records the overall lowest score in this study
due to defections from 3/4 of the group population.
 We observe an increasing gap between Selective Cooperators and Naive Coop-
erators because:
{ Selective Cooperators' interaction reward for defection increases with play-
ers' own abilities.
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{ Naive Cooperators' benet with Selective Cooperators and Naive Cooper-
ators is almost independent of own abilities.
 Naive Defectors may not benet signicantly from interaction with Selective
Cooperators and LimitedC-Fixed strategies, higher abilities defectors perform
well due to higher individual activity.
Group Success
 A low ability Naive Defector that faces mutual non-engagement against 75% of
the group population falls below the failure threshold.
 The group adjusted average score is 200.35. This is basically because Selective
Cooperators promote cooperation among Native Cooperators and LimitedC-
Fixed strategy supports all agents with higher abilities.
 Only agents with higher level abilities contribute signicantly to group success
with very minimal support from lower ability agents.
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5.2.6 Group Composition 6
Agents Abilities
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Figure 5.6: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 6
Individual Success
 Individual performance of LimitedC-Ratio strategy with higher abilities are
lower than LimitedC-Fixed strategies in group 5 because:
{ LimitedC-Ratio agents only defect when reward for mutual cooperation is
lower than mutual defection.
{ LimitedC-Fixed agents defects against all agents with abilities  6.
 LimitedC-Ratio strategy does not dominate in individual performance but sig-
nicantly increases group performance.
 Naive Cooperators perform better in this group than all other groups.
67
Group Success
 We observe an equal failure percentage as group 5. However, the performance
of the agent below the failure threshold in this group is better than group 5.
 Consistent with our expectation, the group adjusted average score for this com-
position is 209.55 representing the highest in our study so far. This is because
Selective Cooperators promote cooperation with all agents except Naive De-
fectors and LimitedC-Ratio agents use an ability-based individually rational
technique to promote group success.
 The individual rational approach of LimitedC-Ratio strategy may reduce their
own individual performance but signicantly increase group performance.
5.3 Inter-group Comparisons
We now compare the performance of each of the six group compositions examined in
this study. The purpose of inter-group comparison is to determine and analyze the
overall nature of the dierent group compositions and also compare the performance
levels of two or more groups.
5.3.1 Failure Percentage
For all group compositions, we measure the percentage of agents that scored an ad-
justed average value below the failure threshold. We assume a failure threshold of 5
and analyze the failure percentage for all 6 group structures as shown in Figure 5.7.
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We observe the following:
 The more generalized approach by LimitedC-Fixed strategy to defect against
all agents with abilities (a < 8) reduces the performance of lower ability agents
and therefore increases the failure percentage to 16.67%.
 Selective Cooperators' collective rationality to support cooperation reduces the
failure percentage in group 2. This is lower than the higher failure percentage
observed in group 3.
 Both groups 5 and 6 record only 1 agent (low ability Naive Defector) below the
failure threshold because of the presence of advanced strategies. However, with
regards to individual performance, group 6 is safer for the low ability Naive
Defector because it performs better than in group 5.
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Figure 5.7: Failure Percentage distribution for dierent group composition
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5.3.2 Group Total Score
We compare the group total score between agents in group composition 3 and 5 that
has LimitedC-Fixed strategy with group 4 and 6 that has LimitedC-Ratio strategy
due to shared similarities in the number of agents and other kinds of strategies. Our
observation as shown in Figure 5.8 indicates that the overall group total score in
group 4 (3173.4) is slightly higher than group 3 (2993.4). Similarly, a comparison
between group 5 and 6 as shown in Figure 5.9 indicates that group structure 6 reports
a group total score of (5785.2) whilst group 5 only had (5542.8). The higher group
total score in composition 4 and 6 comparable to 3 and 5 respectively is because the
LimitedC-Ratio strategy which is implemented in group 4 and 6 cooperates with some
lower-ability defectors against which LimitedC-Fixed strategy defects.
Figure 5.8: Group Total Score: 3 vs. 4 Figure 5.9: Group Total Score: 5 vs. 6
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5.3.3 Group Average Score
The group average score provide an exact method to compare group success between
group 3 vs. 4 and 5 vs. 6. We observe a group average score of 176.3 and 241.05 in
group 4 and 6 respectively. This is slightly higher than the comparable average group
score of 166.3 and 230.95 reported in group 3 and 5 respectively. Figures 5.10 and
5.11 display our results.
Figure 5.10: Group Avg Score: 3 vs. 4 Figure 5.11: Group Avg Score: 5 vs. 6
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5.3.4 Group Adjusted Average Scores
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Figure 5.12: Group adjusted average scores
Across all 6 group structures, we measure and compare the performance of each
group based on their group adjusted average scores. We observe that;
 The combination of Selective Cooperators and LimitedC-Ratio strategies in
group 6 promotes cooperation and results in the highest group adjusted av-
erage score of 209.55. This is higher than the adjusted average score observed
in group 5 (200.35).
 The individually rational approach of LimitedC-Ratio strategy gives group 4 a
higher adjusted average score than group 3.
 The adjusted average score of group 2 (150.5) is higher than group 3 (146.1) but
slightly lower than group 4 (155.3).
 The lowest group adjusted average score (98) was recorded in group 1 because it
consist of only naive agents that make decisions without any form of information
gathering mechanism.
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5.4 Overall Observation and Analysis
 In all group compositions, we observe that increasing ability levels positively
aect the individual scores of agents due to high impact of individual activity.
 In all instances, we have observed that the presence of Selective Cooperators
positively favour the performance of Naive Cooperators but reduce the individ-
ual performance of Naive Defectors.
 The use of acquired information assist advanced agents to increase their indi-
vidual performance and also support the development of cooperation. This was
observed in group compositions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
 A generalized approach to cooperation and defection based on ability levels
increases group failure percentage. Group success increases when agents that
cooperate or defect based on abilities decide individually.
 Naively cooperating or defecting does not promote group success even though
it may support the performance of some individuals.
 A comparison of the group adjusted average performance between group 2 and
group 4 leads us to conclude that group success is not only about naively helping
cooperators but more about using an advanced approach to cooperate by also
considering ability levels.
 Furthermore, we can infer from the adjusted average score of group composition
6 that an appropriate proportion of strategies that cooperate based on gathered
information on partner's strategy and ability levels increases the overall group
success.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have introduced, implemented, and investigated a novel modelling
and simulation framework for the study of cooperation among self-interested players
in multiagent systems (MAS). As the basis for our game-theoretic modelling, we adopt
the Ability Based Cooperation (ABC) game and the Extended ABC (EABC) game
dened within our research group at UNBC. The framework allows for the modelling
of several common aspects of natural and articial systems that, to the best of our
knowledge, have not been adequately addressed in the existing literature.
The specic contributions of the framework include:
 Balancing individual activity and interaction. A player in our study can make
progress through individual activity or by interaction with others.
 The abilities of players are included in the modelling. The scores from both
individual activities and interactions depend on the individual abilities of the
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players. This means that the payo a player receives from an encounter is based
on the ability level of the player and/or its partner and the base payo.
 We dene several advanced agent strategies that use knowledge about partners'
abilities or strategies in deciding whether or not to cooperate. Our interest is
in the strategic eect of acquired information and not in the mechanism for
information acquisition.
 There is a balance between individual and group success. The players' abilities,
strategies, and the group composition inuence both individual scores and the
success of the group as a whole. Our framework provides the possibility to mea-
sure both kinds of success. Individual strategies can be designed with the intent
to achieve specic impact with respect to individual and group performance.
 We evaluate individual strategies as to how much they contribute to the indi-
vidual success of the players and the group success. This is done to observe the
inuence of information gathering on individual achievement and overall group
performance.
We have demonstrated the properties of this framework with a comparative experi-
mental study of six group compositions, each with a dierent strategy combination
and a full range of individual abilities. For each strategy, the study allows us to ana-
lyze its performance in dierent group compositions, its impact upon other strategies,
and its impact upon group performance.
The results lead us to conclude that the framework is a suitable tool for such studies,
and expect that it could be successfully applied to more complex strategies and group
compositions.
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In future studies, we can:
 explore higher levels of modelling where dierent mechanisms of information
gathering can be examined and their impact on individual and group success
analyzed;
 introduce and observe increasingly complex groups of agent strategies such as
an advanced strategy that seeks to promote ability development among group
members;
 investigate the inuence of other experimenter-controlled limitations such as
pay-o matrix on individual and group performance.
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Appendix A
A.1 Graphs and Tables of Results
A.1.1 Group Composition 1
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 2 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 12
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
81
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
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82
Agents' Abilities
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
A
dj
us
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
co
re
s
0
5
10
15
20
NAIVE C
NAIVE D
Figure A.1: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in composition group 1
ID Strategy Ability
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Adjusted
Total
Scores
Adjusted
Average
Scores
1 NaiveC 12 142.80 12.98 132.00 13.20
2 NaiveD 12 178.80 16.25 156.00 15.60
3 NaiveC 10 124.60 11.33 115.60 11.56
4 NaiveD 10 154.60 14.05 135.60 13.56
5 NaiveC 8 106.40 9.67 99.20 9.92
6 NaiveD 8 130.40 11.85 115.20 11.52
7 NaiveC 6 88.20 8.02 82.80 8.28
8 NaiveD 6 106.20 9.65 94.80 9.48
9 NaiveC 4 70.00 6.36 66.40 6.64
10 NaiveD 4 82.00 7.45 74.40 7.44
11 NaiveC 2 51.80 4.71 50.00 5.00
12 NaiveD 2 57.80 5.25 54.00 5.40
Table A.1: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 1
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
NC ND NC ND NC ND NC ND NC ND NC ND
1 NC 10.80 18.80 10.80 17.20 10.80 15.60 10.80 14.00 10.80 12.40 10.80
2 ND 22.80 21.20 13.20 19.60 13.20 18.00 13.20 16.40 13.20 14.80 13.20
3 NC 18.60 9.00 9.00 15.40 9.00 13.80 9.00 12.20 9.00 10.60 9.00
4 ND 20.60 11.00 19.00 17.40 11.00 15.80 11.00 14.20 11.00 12.60 11.00
5 NC 16.80 7.20 15.20 7.20 7.20 12.00 7.20 10.40 7.20 8.80 7.20
6 ND 18.40 8.80 16.80 8.80 15.20 13.60 8.80 12.00 8.80 10.40 8.80
7 NC 15.00 5.40 13.40 5.40 11.80 5.40 5.40 8.60 5.40 7.00 5.40
8 ND 16.20 6.60 14.60 6.60 13.00 6.60 11.40 9.80 6.60 8.20 6.60
9 NC 13.20 3.60 11.60 3.60 10.00 3.60 8.40 3.60 3.60 5.20 3.60
10 ND 14.00 4.40 12.40 4.40 10.80 4.40 9.20 4.40 7.60 6.00 4.40
11 NC 11.40 1.80 9.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 6.60 1.80 5.00 1.80 1.80
12 ND 11.80 2.20 10.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 7.00 2.20 5.40 2.20 3.80
Table A.2: Agents' scores Group Composition 1
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A.1.2 Group Composition 2
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 3 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6, SelectiveC = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 18
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
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{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
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Figure A.2: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in composition group 2
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ID Strategy Ability
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Total
Adjusted
Scores
Average
Adjusted
Scores
1 NaiveC 12 241.20 14.19 210.00 14.00
2 NaiveD 12 258.00 15.18 222.00 14.80
3 SelectiveC 12 255.60 15.04 222.00 14.80
4 NaiveC 10 212.20 12.48 186.20 12.41
5 NaiveD 10 220.60 12.98 190.60 12.71
6 SelectiveC 10 224.20 13.19 196.20 13.08
7 NaiveC 8 183.20 10.78 162.40 10.83
8 NaiveD 8 183.20 10.78 159.20 10.61
9 SelectiveC 8 192.80 11.34 170.40 11.36
10 NaiveC 6 154.20 9.07 138.60 9.24
11 NaiveD 6 145.80 8.58 127.80 8.52
12 SelectiveC 6 161.40 9.49 144.60 9.64
13 NaiveC 4 125.20 7.36 114.80 7.65
14 NaiveD 4 108.40 6.38 96.40 6.43
15 SelectiveC 4 130.00 7.65 118.80 7.92
16 NaiveC 2 96.20 5.66 91.00 6.07
17 NaiveD 2 71.00 4.18 65.00 4.33
18 SelectiveC 2 98.60 5.80 93.00 6.20
Table A.3: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 2
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
NC ND SC NC ND SC NC ND SC NC ND SC NC ND SC NC ND SC
1 NC 10.80 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 12.40 10.80 12.40
2 ND 22.80 13.20 21.20 13.20 13.20 19.60 13.20 13.20 18.00 13.20 13.20 16.40 13.20 13.20 14.80 13.20 13.20
3 SC 20.40 13.20 18.80 13.20 18.80 17.20 13.20 17.20 15.60 13.20 15.60 14.00 13.20 14.00 12.40 13.20 12.40
4 NC 18.60 9.00 18.60 9.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 10.60 9.00 10.60
5 ND 20.60 11.00 11.00 19.00 11.00 17.40 11.00 11.00 15.80 11.00 11.00 14.20 11.00 11.00 12.60 11.00 11.00
6 SC 18.60 11.00 18.60 17.00 11.00 15.40 11.00 15.40 13.80 11.00 13.80 12.20 11.00 12.20 10.60 11.00 10.60
7 NC 16.80 7.20 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 7.20 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80
8 ND 18.40 8.80 8.80 16.80 8.80 8.80 15.20 8.80 13.60 8.80 8.80 12.00 8.80 8.80 10.40 8.80 8.80
9 SC 16.80 8.80 16.80 15.20 8.80 15.20 13.60 8.80 12.00 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40 8.80 8.80 8.80
10 NC 15.00 5.40 15.00 13.40 5.40 13.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 5.40 10.20 8.60 5.40 8.60 7.00 5.40 7.00
11 ND 16.20 6.60 6.60 14.60 6.60 6.60 13.00 6.60 6.60 11.40 6.60 9.80 6.60 6.60 8.20 6.60 6.60
12 SC 15.00 6.60 15.00 13.40 6.60 13.40 11.80 6.60 11.80 10.20 6.60 8.60 6.60 8.60 7.00 6.60 7.00
13 NC 13.20 3.60 13.20 11.60 3.60 11.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 8.40 3.60 8.40 3.60 6.80 5.20 3.60 5.20
14 ND 14.00 4.40 4.40 12.40 4.40 4.40 10.80 4.40 4.40 9.20 4.40 4.40 7.60 4.40 6.00 4.40 4.40
15 SC 13.20 4.40 13.20 11.60 4.40 11.60 10.00 4.40 10.00 8.40 4.40 8.40 6.80 4.40 5.20 4.40 5.20
16 NC 11.40 1.80 11.40 9.80 1.80 9.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 6.60 1.80 6.60 5.00 1.80 5.00 1.80 3.40
17 ND 11.80 2.20 2.20 10.20 2.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 2.20 7.00 2.20 2.20 5.40 2.20 2.20 3.80 2.20
18 SC 11.40 2.20 11.40 9.80 2.20 9.80 8.20 2.20 8.20 6.60 2.20 6.60 5.00 2.20 5.00 3.40 2.20
Table A.4: Agents' scores Group Composition 2
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A.1.3 Group Composition 3
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 3 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6, LimitedC-Fixed = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 18
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
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{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
Experimental Results
Agents' Abilities
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
A
dj
us
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
co
re
s
0
5
10
15
20
NAIVE C
NAIVE D
LIMITEDC-F
Figure A.3: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 3
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ID Strategy Ability
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Total
Adjusted
Scores
Average
Adjusted
Scores
1 NaiveC 12 241.20 14.19 210.00 14.00
2 NaiveD 12 291.60 17.15 246.00 16.40
3 LC-F 12 262.80 15.46 231.60 15.44
4 NaiveC 10 212.20 12.48 186.20 12.41
5 NaiveD 10 254.20 14.95 216.20 14.41
6 LC-F 10 230.20 13.54 204.20 13.61
7 NaiveC 8 183.20 10.78 162.40 10.83
8 NaiveD 8 216.80 12.75 186.40 12.43
9 LC-F 8 197.60 11.62 176.80 11.79
10 NaiveC 6 120.60 7.09 109.80 7.32
11 NaiveD 6 145.80 8.58 127.80 8.52
12 LC-F 6 135.00 7.94 117.00 7.80
13 NaiveC 4 91.60 5.39 84.40 5.63
14 NaiveD 4 108.40 6.38 96.40 6.43
15 LC-F 4 101.20 5.95 89.20 5.95
16 NaiveC 2 62.60 3.68 59.00 3.93
17 NaiveD 2 71.00 4.18 65.00 4.33
18 LC-F 2 67.40 3.96 61.40 4.09
Table A.5: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 3
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
NC ND LC-F NC ND LC-F NC ND LC-F NC ND LC-F NC ND LC-F NC ND LC-F
1 NC 10.80 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 12.40 10.8 12.40
2 ND 22.8 22.8 21.2 13.2 21.2 19.6 13.2 19.6 18 13.2 18 16.4 13.2 16.4 14.8 13.2 14.8
3 LC-F 20.40 10.80 18.80 10.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 18.00 13.20 18.00 16.40 13.20 16.40 14.80 13.20 14.80
4 NC 18.60 9.00 18.60 9.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 10.60 9.00 10.60
5 ND 20.60 11.00 20.60 19.00 19.00 17.40 11.00 17.40 15.80 11.00 15.80 14.20 11.00 14.20 12.60 11.00 12.60
6 LC-F 18.60 9.00 18.60 17.00 9.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 15.80 11.00 15.80 14.20 11.00 14.20 12.60 11.00 12.60
7 NC 16.80 7.20 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 7.20 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80
8 ND 18.40 8.80 18.40 16.80 8.80 16.80 15.20 15.20 13.60 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40
9 LC-F 16.80 7.20 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 13.60 7.20 13.60 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40
10 NC 15.00 5.40 5.40 13.40 5.40 5.40 11.80 5.40 5.40 5.40 5.40 8.60 5.40 5.40 7.00 5.40 5.4 0
11 ND 16.20 6.60 6.60 14.60 6.60 6.60 13.00 6.60 6.60 11.40 6.60 9.80 6.60 6.60 8.20 6.60 6.60
12 LC-F 15.00 5.40 5.40 13.40 5.40 5.40 11.80 5.40 5.40 11.40 6.60 9.80 6.60 6.60 8.20 6.60 6.60
13 NC 13.20 3.60 3.60 11.60 3.60 3.60 10.00 3.60 3.60 8.40 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 5.20 3.60 3.60
14 ND 14.00 4.40 4.40 12.40 4.40 4.40 10.80 4.40 4.40 9.20 4.40 4.40 7.60 4.40 6.00 4.40 4.40
15 LC-F 13.20 3.60 3.60 11.60 3.60 3.60 10.00 3.60 3.60 9.20 4.40 4.40 7.60 4.40 6.00 4.40 4.40
16 NC 11.40 1.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 1.80 6.60 1.80 1.80 5.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.80
17 ND 11.80 2.20 2.20 10.20 2.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 2.20 7.00 2.20 2.20 5.40 2.20 2.20 3.80 2.20
18 LC-F 11.40 1.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 1.80 7.00 2.20 2.20 5.40 2.20 2.20 3.80 2.20
Table A.6: Agents' match scores for Group Composition 3
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A.1.4 Group Composition 4
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 3 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6, LimitedC-Ratio = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 18
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
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{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
Experimental Results
Agents' Abilities
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
A
dj
us
te
d 
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
co
re
s
0
5
10
15
20
NAIVE C
NAIVE D
LIMITEDC-R
Figure A.4: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 4
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ID Strategy Ability
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Total
Adjusted
Scores
Average
Adjusted
Scores
1 NaiveC 12 241.20 14.19 210.00 14.00
2 NaiveD 12 291.60 17.15 246.00 16.40
3 LC-R 12 248.40 14.61 217.20 14.48
4 NaiveC 10 212.20 12.48 186.20 12.41
5 NaiveD 10 254.20 14.95 216.20 14.41
6 LC-R 10 218.20 12.84 192.20 12.81
7 NaiveC 8 183.20 10.78 162.40 10.83
8 NaiveD 8 216.80 12.75 186.40 12.43
9 LC-R 8 183.20 10.78 162.40 10.83
10 NaiveC 6 154.20 9.07 138.60 9.24
11 NaiveD 6 179.40 10.55 156.60 10.44
12 LC-R 6 154.20 9.07 138.60 9.24
13 NaiveC 4 125.20 7.36 114.80 7.65
14 NaiveD 4 142.00 8.35 126.80 8.45
15 LC-R 4 125.20 7.36 114.80 7.65
16 NaiveC 2 78.60 4.62 73.40 4.89
17 NaiveD 2 87.00 5.12 79.40 5.29
18 LC-R 2 78.60 4.62 73.40 4.89
Table A.7: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 4
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
NC ND LC-R NC ND LC-R NC ND LC-R NC ND LC-R NC ND LC-R NC ND LC-R
1 NC 10.80 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 12.40 10.80 12.40
2 ND 22.80 22.80 21.20 13.20 21.20 19.60 13.20 19.60 18.00 13.20 18.00 16.40 13.20 16.40 14.80 13.20 14.80
3 LC-R 20.40 10.80 18.80 10.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 14.80 13.20 14.80
4 NC 18.60 9.00 18.60 9.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 10.60 9.00 10.60
5 ND 20.60 11.00 20.60 19.00 19.00 17.40 11.00 17.40 15.80 11.00 15.80 14.20 11.00 14.20 12.60 11.00 12.60
6 LC-R 18.60 9.00 18.60 17.00 9.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 12.60 11.00 12.60
7 NC 16.80 7.20 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 7.20 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80
8 ND 18.40 8.80 18.40 16.80 8.80 16.80 15.20 15.20 13.60 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40
9 LC-R 16.80 7.20 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 13.60 7.20 12.00 7.20 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80
10 NC 15.00 5.40 15.00 13.40 5.40 13.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 5.40 10.20 8.60 5.40 8.60 7.00 5.40 7.00
11 ND 16.20 6.60 16.20 14.60 6.60 14.60 13.00 6.60 13.00 11.40 11.40 9.80 6.60 9.80 8.20 6.60 8.20
12 LC-R 15.00 5.40 15.00 13.40 5.40 13.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 10.20 5.40 8.60 5.40 8.60 7.00 5.40 7.00
13 NC 13.20 3.60 13.20 11.60 3.60 11.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 8.40 3.60 8.40 3.60 6.80 5.20 3.60 5.20
14 ND 14.00 4.40 14.00 12.40 4.40 12.40 10.80 4.40 10.80 9.20 4.40 9.20 7.60 7.60 6.00 4.40 6.00
15 LC-R 13.20 3.60 13.20 11.60 3.60 11.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 8.40 3.60 8.40 6.80 3.60 5.20 3.60 5.20
16 NC 11.40 1.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 6.60 1.80 6.60 5.00 1.80 5.00 1.80 3.40
17 ND 11.80 2.20 2.20 10.20 2.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 8.60 7.00 2.20 7.00 5.40 2.20 5.40 3.80 3.80
18 LC-R 11.40 1.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 6.60 1.80 6.60 5.00 1.80 5.00 3.40 1.80
Table A.8: Agents' match scores for Group Composition 4
96
A.1.5 Group Composition 5
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 4 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6, SelectiveC = 6, LimitedC-
Fixed = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 24
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
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{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
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Figure A.5: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 5
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ID Strategy Abilities
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Adjusted
Total
Score
Adjusted
Average
Score
1 NaiveC 12 339.60 14.77 288.00 14.40
2 NaiveD 12 370.80 16.12 312.00 15.60
3 SelectiveC 12 354.00 15.39 300.00 15.00
4 LC-F 12 368.40 16.02 316.80 15.84
5 NaiveC 10 299.80 13.03 256.80 12.84
6 NaiveD 10 320.20 13.92 271.20 13.56
7 SelectiveC 10 311.80 13.56 266.80 13.34
8 LC-F 10 323.80 14.08 280.80 14.04
9 NaiveC 8 260.00 11.30 225.60 11.28
10 NaiveD 8 269.60 11.72 230.40 11.52
11 SelectiveC 8 269.60 11.72 233.60 11.68
12 LC-F 8 279.20 12.14 244.80 12.24
13 NaiveC 6 186.60 8.11 165.60 8.28
14 NaiveD 6 185.40 8.06 160.80 8.04
15 SelectiveC 6 193.80 8.43 171.60 8.58
16 LC-F 6 204.60 8.90 175.20 8.76
17 NaiveC 4 146.80 6.38 132.80 6.64
18 NaiveD 4 134.80 5.86 118.40 5.92
19 SelectiveC 4 151.60 6.59 136.80 6.84
20 LC-F 4 158.80 6.90 139.20 6.96
21 NaiveC 2 107.00 4.65 100.00 5.00
22 NaiveD 2 84.20 3.66 76.00 3.80
23 SelectiveC 2 109.40 4.76 102.00 5.10
24 LC-F 2 113.00 4.91 103.20 5.16
Table A.9: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 5
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
NC ND SC LC-F NC ND SC LC-F NC ND SC LC-F NC ND SC LC-F NC ND SC LC-F NC ND SC LC-F
1 NC 10.80 20.40 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 14.00 12.40 10.80 12.40 12.40
2 ND 22.80 13.20 22.80 21.20 13.20 13.20 21.20 19.60 13.20 13.20 19.60 18.00 13.20 13.20 18.00 16.40 13.20 13.20 16.40 14.80 13.20 13.20 14.80
3 SC 20.40 13.20 20.40 18.80 13.20 18.80 18.80 17.20 13.20 17.20 17.20 15.60 13.20 15.60 15.60 14.00 13.20 14.00 14.00 12.40 13.20 12.40 12.40
4 LC-F 20.40 10.80 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 17.20 18.00 13.20 18.00 18.00 16.40 13.20 16.40 16.40 14.80 13.20 14.80 14.80
5 NC 18.60 9.00 18.60 18.60 9.00 17.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 12.20 10.60 9.00 10.60 10.60
6 ND 20.60 11.00 11.00 20.60 19.00 11.00 19.00 17.40 11.00 11.00 17.40 15.80 11.00 11.00 15.80 14.20 11.00 11.00 14.20 12.60 11.00 11.00 12.60
7 SC 18.60 11.00 18.60 18.60 17.00 11.00 17.00 15.40 11.00 15.40 15.40 13.80 11.00 13.80 13.80 12.20 11.00 12.20 12.20 10.60 11.00 10.60 10.60
8 LC-F 18.60 9.00 18.60 18.60 17.00 9.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 15.40 15.80 11.00 15.80 15.80 14.20 11.00 14.20 14.20 12.60 11.00 12.60 12.60
9 NC 16.80 7.20 16.80 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 15.20 7.20 13.60 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80 8.80
10 ND 18.40 8.80 8.80 18.40 16.80 8.80 8.80 16.80 15.20 8.80 15.20 13.60 8.80 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 8.80 10.40
11 SC 16.80 8.80 16.80 16.80 15.20 8.80 15.20 15.20 13.60 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40 10.40 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80
12 LC-F 16.80 7.20 16.80 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 15.20 13.60 7.20 13.60 13.60 8.80 13.60 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40 10.40
13 NC 15.00 5.40 15.00 5.40 13.40 5.40 13.40 5.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 5.40 5.40 10.20 5.40 8.60 5.40 8.60 5.40 7.00 5.40 7.00 5.40
14 ND 16.20 6.60 6.60 6.60 14.60 6.60 6.60 6.60 13.00 6.60 6.60 6.60 11.40 6.60 6.60 9.80 6.60 6.60 6.60 8.20 6.60 6.60 6.60
15 SC 15.00 6.60 15.00 5.40 13.40 6.60 13.40 5.40 11.80 6.60 11.80 5.40 10.20 6.60 5.40 8.60 6.60 8.60 5.40 7.00 6.60 7.00 5.40
16 LC-F 15.00 5.40 15.00 5.40 13.40 5.40 13.40 5.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 5.40 11.40 6.60 11.40 9.80 6.60 9.80 6.60 8.20 6.60 8.20 6.60
17 NC 13.20 3.60 13.20 3.60 11.60 3.60 11.60 3.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 3.60 8.40 3.60 8.40 3.60 3.60 6.80 3.60 5.20 3.60 5.20 3.60
18 ND 14.00 4.40 4.40 4.40 12.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 10.80 4.40 4.40 4.40 9.20 4.40 4.40 4.40 7.60 4.40 4.40 6.00 4.40 4.40 4.40
19 SC 13.20 4.40 13.20 3.60 11.60 4.40 11.60 3.60 10.00 4.40 10.00 3.60 8.40 4.40 8.40 3.60 6.80 4.40 3.60 5.20 4.40 5.20 3.60
20 LC-F 13.20 3.60 13.20 3.60 11.60 3.60 11.60 3.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 3.60 9.20 4.40 9.20 4.40 7.60 4.40 7.60 6.00 4.40 6.00 4.40
21 NC 11.40 1.80 11.40 1.80 9.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 1.80 6.60 1.80 6.60 1.80 5.00 1.80 5.00 1.80 1.80 3.40 1.80
22 ND 11.80 2.20 2.20 2.20 10.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 2.20 2.20 7.00 2.20 2.20 2.20 5.40 2.20 2.20 2.20 3.80 2.20 2.20
23 SC 11.40 2.20 11.40 1.80 9.80 2.20 9.80 1.80 8.20 2.20 8.20 1.80 6.60 2.20 6.60 1.80 5.00 2.20 5.00 1.80 3.40 2.20 1.80
24 LC-F 11.40 1.80 11.40 1.80 9.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 1.80 7.00 2.20 7.00 2.20 5.40 2.20 5.40 2.20 3.80 2.20 3.80
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A.1.6 Group Composition 6
Parameter Settings
 Agent strategies (k = 4 ): NaiveC = 6, NaiveD = 6, SelectiveC = 6, LimitedC-
Ratio = 6
 Ability levels (q = 6 ): 12, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2
 Number of agents (n = k*q): 24
 Base payos : T = 10, R = 8, P = 2, S = 0
 Balancing factor (): = 0.9
 Number of tournament iterations : 1
Formulas
 Individual Scores of agent i:
{ Score vs. agent j : s
(j)
i = ai+(1 )p(j)i where p(j)i is the payo of i vs. j.
{ Total score: stoti =
nP
j=1
j 6=i
s
(j)
i
{ Average score: savgi =
stoti
n 1
{ Adjusted total score: satoti =
nP
j=1
aj 6=ai
s
(j)
i
{ Adjusted average score: saavgi =
satoti
k(q 1) .
 Group Scores:
{ Group total score: stot =
nP
1
stoti
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{ Group average score: savg = s
tot
n
{ Group adjusted total score: satot =
nP
1
satoti
{ Group adjusted average score: saavg = s
atot
n
Experimental Results
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Figure A.6: Agents' performance for dierent ability levels in group composition 6
102
ID Strategy Abilities
Total
Score
Average
Scores
Adjusted
Total
Score
Adjusted
Average
Score
1 NaiveC 12 339.60 14.77 288.00 14.40
2 NaiveD 12 370.80 16.12 312.00 15.60
3 SelectiveC 12 354.00 15.39 300.00 15.00
4 LC-R 12 349.20 15.18 297.60 14.88
5 NaiveC 10 299.80 13.03 256.80 12.84
6 NaiveD 10 320.20 13.92 271.20 13.56
7 SelectiveC 10 311.80 13.56 266.80 13.34
8 LC-R 10 307.80 13.38 264.80 13.24
9 NaiveC 8 260.00 11.30 225.60 11.28
10 NaiveD 8 269.60 11.72 230.40 11.52
11 SelectiveC 8 269.60 11.72 233.60 11.68
12 LC-R 8 260.00 11.30 225.60 11.28
13 NaiveC 6 220.20 9.57 194.40 9.72
14 NaiveD 6 219.00 9.52 189.60 9.48
15 SelectiveC 6 227.40 9.89 200.40 10.02
16 LC-R 6 220.20 9.57 194.40 9.72
17 NaiveC 4 180.40 7.84 163.20 8.16
18 NaiveD 4 168.40 7.32 148.80 7.44
19 SelectiveC 4 185.20 8.05 167.20 8.36
20 LC-R 4 180.40 7.84 163.20 8.16
21 NaiveC 2 123.00 5.35 114.40 5.72
22 NaiveD 2 100.20 4.36 90.40 4.52
23 SelectiveC 2 125.40 5.45 116.40 5.82
24 LC-R 2 123.00 5.35 114.40 5.72
Table A.11: Agents' average and adjusted average scores for Group Composition 6
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
NC ND SC LC-R NC ND SC LC-R NC ND SC LC-R NC ND SC LC-R NC ND SC LC-R NC ND SC LC-R
1 NC 10.80 20.40 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 14.00 12.40 10.80 12.40 12.40
2 ND 22.80 13.20 22.80 21.20 13.20 13.20 21.20 19.60 13.20 13.20 19.60 18.00 13.20 13.20 18.00 16.40 13.20 13.20 16.40 14.80 13.20 13.20 14.80
3 SC 20.40 13.20 20.40 18.80 13.20 18.80 18.80 17.20 13.20 17.20 17.20 15.60 13.20 15.60 15.60 14.00 13.20 14.00 14.00 12.40 13.20 12.40 12.40
4 LC-R 20.40 10.80 20.40 18.80 10.80 18.80 18.80 17.20 10.80 17.20 17.20 15.60 10.80 15.60 15.60 14.00 10.80 14.00 14.00 14.80 13.20 14.80 14.80
5 NC 18.60 9.00 18.60 18.60 9.00 17.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 12.20 10.60 9.00 10.60 10.60
6 ND 20.60 11.00 11.00 20.60 19.00 11.00 19.00 17.40 11.00 11.00 17.40 15.80 11.00 11.00 15.80 14.20 11.00 11.00 14.20 12.60 11.00 11.00 12.60
7 SC 18.60 11.00 18.60 18.60 17.00 11.00 17.00 15.40 11.00 15.40 15.40 13.80 11.00 13.80 13.80 12.20 11.00 12.20 12.20 10.60 11.00 10.60 10.60
8 LC-R 18.60 9.00 18.60 18.60 17.00 9.00 17.00 15.40 9.00 15.40 15.40 13.80 9.00 13.80 13.80 12.20 9.00 12.20 12.20 12.60 11.00 12.60 12.60
9 NC 16.80 7.20 16.80 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 15.20 7.20 13.60 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80 8.80
10 ND 18.40 8.80 8.80 18.40 16.80 8.80 8.80 16.80 15.20 8.80 15.20 13.60 8.80 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 8.80 12.00 10.40 8.80 8.80 10.40
11 SC 16.80 8.80 16.80 16.80 15.20 8.80 15.20 15.20 13.60 8.80 13.60 12.00 8.80 12.00 12.00 10.40 8.80 10.40 10.40 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80
12 LC-R 16.80 7.20 16.80 16.80 15.20 7.20 15.20 15.20 13.60 7.20 13.60 12.00 7.20 12.00 12.00 10.40 7.20 10.40 10.40 8.80 7.20 8.80 8.80
13 NC 15.00 5.40 15.00 15.00 13.40 5.40 13.40 13.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 11.80 5.40 10.20 10.20 8.60 5.40 8.60 8.60 7.00 5.40 7.00 7.00
14 ND 16.20 6.60 6.60 16.20 14.60 6.60 6.60 14.60 13.00 6.60 6.60 13.00 11.40 6.60 11.40 9.80 6.60 6.60 9.80 8.20 6.60 6.60 8.20
15 SC 15.00 6.60 15.00 15.00 13.40 6.60 13.40 13.40 11.80 6.60 11.80 11.80 10.20 6.60 10.20 8.60 6.60 8.60 8.60 7.00 6.60 7.00 7.00
16 LC-R 15.00 5.40 15.00 15.00 13.40 5.40 13.40 13.40 11.80 5.40 11.80 11.80 10.20 5.40 10.20 8.60 5.40 8.60 8.60 7.00 5.40 7.00 7.00
17 NC 13.20 3.60 13.20 13.20 11.60 3.60 11.60 11.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 10.00 8.40 3.60 8.40 8.40 3.60 6.80 6.80 5.20 3.60 5.20 5.20
18 ND 14.00 4.40 4.40 14.00 12.40 4.40 4.40 12.40 10.80 4.40 4.40 10.80 9.20 4.40 4.40 9.20 7.60 4.40 7.60 6.00 4.40 4.40 6.00
19 SC 13.20 4.40 13.20 13.20 11.60 4.40 11.60 11.60 10.00 4.40 10.00 10.00 8.40 4.40 8.40 8.40 6.80 4.40 6.80 5.20 4.40 5.20 5.20
20 LC-R 13.20 3.60 13.20 13.20 11.60 3.60 11.60 11.60 10.00 3.60 10.00 10.00 8.40 3.60 8.40 8.40 6.80 3.60 6.80 5.20 3.60 5.20 5.20
21 NC 11.40 1.80 11.40 1.80 9.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 8.20 6.60 1.80 6.60 6.60 5.00 1.80 5.00 5.00 1.80 3.40 3.40
22 ND 11.80 2.20 2.20 2.20 10.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 8.60 2.20 2.20 8.60 7.00 2.20 2.20 7.00 5.40 2.20 2.20 5.40 3.80 2.20 3.80
23 SC 11.40 2.20 11.40 1.80 9.80 2.20 9.80 1.80 8.20 2.20 8.20 8.20 6.60 2.20 6.60 6.60 5.00 2.20 5.00 5.00 3.40 2.20 3.40
24 LC-R 11.40 1.80 11.40 1.80 9.80 1.80 9.80 1.80 8.20 1.80 8.20 8.20 6.60 1.80 6.60 6.60 5.00 1.80 5.00 5.00 3.40 1.80 3.40
Table A.12: Agents' match scores for Group Composition 6
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